nuclear weapons

More #INMM2014!

As some of you have realized by now, @StrategicSwag is a blog you should follow. Below is a link to their definite guide of the #INMM2014 conference:

INMM 2014

You should check it out, and see what the top three buzzwords of #INMM2014 were, what do they mean, and why they’re going to be important in the years to come.

There’s some brief notes by the other @StrategicSwag writer, a few lines by yours truly, and overall a straightforward brief on what what we learned and how we plan to use it.

-Cervando Banuelos is currently a Nuclear Safeguards Intern at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a Graduate Research Assistant at the Monterey Institute of International Studies where he is currently pursuing a master’s of arts in nonproliferation and terrorism studies, and holds a bachelor’s of science degree in nuclear engineering, with a minor in radiological health engineering, from Texas A&M University. His interests include passive cooling systems in boiling water reactors, nuclear forensics, arms control treaties, treaty verification, and bow ties. He hopes to some day work for the United Nations, a national laboratory, or the CTBTO.

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Important Uranium Isotopes For Dummies!

Yesterday I was at work and a coworker @mariannefisher asked me where she could find a chart that had the information of important uranium isotopes. So being the nerd I am I made a chart that contained the important information of the major isotopes. The chart is attached, and a high res version can be found here:

follow at:

@strategicswag

@nuclearfarmboy

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Nuclear Safeguards Course Day 1

I am currently attending the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis Course at the Monterey Institute of International Studies also co-sposnsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

Yesterday was day 1 of the course, and for 8 hours we sat and listened to experts outline the origins of safeguards, the foundations of the Nonproliferation Treaty safeguards (NPT), facility-level safeguards implementation, and even got to play with some of the equipment an IAEA inspector would use at a site inspection.

I just want to take a few lines and outline a few points that I find interesting to the research work I have done at CNS, and that I hope to incorporate into the research project I plan to undertake at LLNL this summer as an intern.

During the first presentation we discussed and dove into the different statutes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to understand the nature and origins of safeguards as outlined by the international community. Here I realized the explicit purpose of safeguards is not to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology from peaceful uses, but rather the detection of said diversion. This is an interesting view that I had never realized and why it leads to some states to be “sneaky” about going about their clandestine nuclear programs. What I also learned was that despite this, safeguards do in fact deter diversion indirectly. Nobody likes to get caught redhanded breaking a big treaty like the NPT, so the risk of being caught diverting material deters the diversion of material. This goes on to show the power and need for nuclear safeguards.

When we reviewed the history and foundation of the NPT safeguards, I learned about the bilateral safeguards agreements that started during the early days of the atomic era where one nuclear state would share the technology to an allied state it trusted to not divert from peaceful uses. This presented a problem since it left out non-allies and left many partnerships that had no security assurances over others and that were vulnerable to changes in governance of the state, such as the case with the Iranian Revolution. These bilateral arrangements led to the first nuclear weapons free zone under the first nonproliferation treaty, not a misuse treaty. The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) provided nuclear negative security assurances between states and states with territories in the South American and Caribbean region after Brazilian and Argentinian interests in nuclear technology, and was a landmark for nuclear safeguards and eventually the NPT regime.

These two thoughts stuck with me and I made sure to make a specific note on them. The whole course has been going quite well and we still have 4 days to go through, with case studies, activities, and discussions where we will review the challenges of safeguards to the 21st century and how they apply to nuclear security.

-Cervando Banuelos is currently a Nuclear Safeguards Intern at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a Graduate Research Assistant at the Monterey Institute of International Studies where he is currently pursuing a master’s of arts in nonproliferation and terrorism studies, and holds a bachelor’s of science degree in nuclear engineering, with a minor in radiological health engineering, from Texas A&M University. His interests include passive cooling systems in boiling water reactors, nuclear forensics, arms control treaties, treaty verification, and long walks on the beach. He hopes to some day work for the United Nations, a national laboratory, or the CTBTO.

The views expressed within this op ed piece DO NOT in any way, shape, or fashion reflect the opinion or views of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the NNSA, nor Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The above statements are only the reflections of the author and his experiences.

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NPT PrepCom 2014 Brief Comments

The 2014 NPT PrepCom in New York concluded a few days ago and everything is now set for the 2015 NPT RevCom. My twitter feed was buzzing with information from multiple organizations and from colleagues from the Monterey Institute of International Studies that were on the ground floor and/or are nonproliferation experts. Now that everything has ben set in stone, I wanted to publish a few comments and link two articles that could inform readers about the PrepCom and what I like to call the “Nuclear State of Affairs”.

The first article from The United States Department of State summarizes a few highlights of the NPT PrepCom, and mentions the Protocol to the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty that the P5 (and others) signed. This protocol “provides legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to the five Central Asian states.” The five states namely being Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The approval of this protocol is a great step forward for the global nonproliferation regime, and benefits the security of the states that have shown their commitment to the NPT and meet their nonproliferation obligations, as said by the Department of State. This protocol, in my opinion, is also a step forward in a more thorough and stronger NPT especially in the uncertain times that are being faced throughout the Asian continent by states like Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Link to the article Here:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225910.htm
Supplementary articles here:
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/225682.htm
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225681.htm

On the note of Iran, the second article I dug up by The New Indian Express (and supported by several Iranian sources and published documents) cited the Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi on the NPT Cluster 3 stated “the right of states to develop full national nuclear fuel cycle should be respected.” and that the exchange and transfer of nuclear materials and technology should be facilitated to Iran. This of course raises some questions and friction about the peaceful use of the nuclear technology for power, research, and medical uses especially with Iran’s tumultuous relationship with the IAEA. Timothy Liston, Deputy Counselor, United States Mission to International Organizations, Vienna, stated: “The United States fully supports the right of all Parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy and nuclear applications for peaceful purposes, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations.” he also stated and cited the many nuclear projects that The United States have supported in the IAEA and the track record The United States has had in civil nuclear cooperation with multiple states. In my personal opinion and commentary, the statements made by the parties were polite and direct, but they were still marked by the underlying friction between them. These statements also showed the difficulties in addressing issues in a multilateral and multinational summit like the NPT PrepCom. The Iranian statement was strongly worded and their position was firm, and so was the statement made by The United States. As the situation develops it is my sincere hope that the two nations can find a mutually beneficial and amicable solution before they undermine the progress made by the NPT in this century and escalate the need for treaties like Protocol to the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

Link to the main articles here:
http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/Remove-Restrictions-on-N-equipment-Transfer-Iran/2014/05/06/article2209281.ece
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/npt/prepcom/remarks/225655.htm
Supplementary articles Here:

Click to access 5May_Iran.pdf

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/05/06/361546/iran-urges-compliance-with-npt/

All in all, the NPT PrepCom was an exciting look into where each NPT state stands especially with the RevCom looming next year. Progress was made in certain areas and frictions were maintained in others, and ultimately we will see where the NPT Regime takes us.

-Cervando Banuelos is a Graduate Research Assistant at the Monterey Institute of International Studies where he is currently pursuing a master’s of arts in nonproliferation and terrorism studies and holds a bachelor’s of science degree in nuclear engineering, with a minor in radiological health engineering, from Texas A&M University. His interests include passive cooling systems in boiling water reactors, nuclear forensics, arms control treaties, treaty verification, and unicycle rides. He hopes to some day work for the United Nations, a national laboratory, or the CTBTO.

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The Virtual Dismantlement of a Nuclear Weapon (Link to Pictures Included)

For the past two semesters I’ve had the opportunity to work at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, where I am working on my master’s degree in nonproliferation and terrorism studies. The project I have worked on under the mentorship of Dr. Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress was the building, programming, and support of a virtual reality simulation in which students could model and simulate the United Kingdom and Norway Initiative where a non-nuclear state verified the dismantlement of a nuclear weapon by a nuclear state. This simulation was an exercise in negotiation, treaty verification protocols, and the virtual reality technology of OpenSim allowed for complete anonymity between the students participating in the exercise and for the students to actually carry out a (virtual) dismantlement and put the procedure and protocols they developed to the test.

This type of simulation allows us to explore the potential and applicability of technologies like OpenSim in which a person assumes the identity of an avatar and interacts with other avatars and users in a world designed for the purpose of the simulation. For this exercise the students were provided with tools and a world I developed. I built operable cranes, information barriers, keypads, seals, working Geiger counters that would click when approached by a radioactive source, high purity germanium (HPGe) detectors that could be calibrated with plutonium and cesium gamma spectra, fences, security checkpoints, and a to-scale virtual disassemble-able United States B-61 thermonuclear weapon. With these tools a facility was made in OpenSim that had the appropriate checkpoints and security measures that the students themselves developed in their procedure. There were conference rooms, verification methods, secure areas, full-body radiation counters, and even emergency doors that rang an alarm when there was an emergency.

I essentially built a whole nuclear dismantlement facility from the comfort of my laptop with all the bells and whistles and helped my professor give students a very immersive learning experience in nuclear treaty verification protocols and negotiations.

Simulations are a vital tool for education, for they are the equivalent of spending hours in a laboratory setting and help apply theoretical approaches and find the bugs in the system. Virtual world technology, while still in its infancy, can help increase the productivity and increase the effectiveness of these simulations. As this technology and methods are developed more, I strongly believe that they can provide the necessary tools for even more complex training endeavors.

Who knows, maybe virtual simulations like these can help the students of today be prepared for the challenges of tomorrow.

Below you will find two Storify pages of the live tweets from the dismantlement visit. (With Pictures!!!)

https://storify.com/ferencdv/nuclear-verification-and-dismantlement-in-a-virtua

https://storify.com/crofer/ferenc

-Cervando Banuelos is a Graduate Research Assistant at the Monterey Institute of International Studies where he is currently pursuing a master’s of arts in nonproliferation and terrorism studies and holds a bachelor’s of science degree in nuclear engineering, with a minor in radiological health engineering, from Texas A&M University. His interests include passive cooling systems in boiling water reactors, nuclear forensics, arms control treaties, treaty verification, and artichokes with mayonnaise. He hopes to some day work for the United Nations, a national laboratory, or the CTBTO.

The views expressed within this op ed piece DO NOT in any way, shape, or fashion reflect the opinion or views of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Dr. Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, nor those of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The above statements are only the reflections of the author and his experiences.